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Sein ganzes berufliches Leben hindurch betrachtete 
Frege die Sprache als eine gefährliche Bedrohung des 
wissenschaftlichen Erkennens, der mit allen Mitteln der 
Logik zu begegnen war. Im ersten Teil des Aufsatzes 
wird aufgezeigt, wie Frege diese Auffassung in oft 
unbewusster und ungewollter Übereinstimmung mit 
gleichzeitigen Tendenzen sowohl in der deutschen 
Linguistik (Becker, Steinthal, Paul, Wundt) als auch in der 
deutschen Sprachkritik (Gruppe, Nietzsche, Mauthner) 
entwickelte und wie sein epistemologischer ‚Kampf 
gegen die Sprache’ mit einer bitteren persönlichen und 
professionellen Niederlage endete. Der zweite Teil des 
Aufsatzes enthält eine Rekonstruktion von Freges 
logischer Grammatik sowie eine Darstellung des 
linguistischen Argumentes, das für Freges endgültiges 
(und tragisches) Akzept vom Sprachskeptizismus 
entscheidend wurde (das sogenannte Fregesche 
Paradox). Der Aufsatz schließt mit einer Evaluierung der 




Until 1980 practically all research on Frege was conducted on the premises that 
Frege’s writings should be interpreted and analysed as if written by a 
contemporaneous mind. Indeed, the common tenor, as presented most 
emphatically and effectively by Dummett in Frege. Philosophy of Language 
(1973),1 was on claiming for Frege the status of a highly original innovator, 
unbiased and unaffected by the thoughts and the writings of his own century. 
Sluga’s book on Frege (Sluga 1980) was the first to draw attention to the traps 
and failures inherent in treating Frege only as a contemporary. In the wake of 
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Sluga’s interpretation, much research has been focussed on placing Frege’s 
writings in the context of their own time. The expected picture is beginning to 
emerge. As the magisterial work of Kreiser (Kreiser 2001) has demonstrated, Frege 
was as dependent on the conceptual horizon of his own time as most mortals 
eventually prove to be. 
To be sure, Frege did not leave much material for source hunting historians to go 
by. By profession Frege was a mathematician. He tried to open his discipline 
towards neighbouring fields such as philosophy and linguistics, but there is only 
scant indication in his writings (published or private) that he acquired any 
professionalism in the process. In the case of philosophy, Frege seems to have 
relied mostly on secondary material. Sluga 1980, Currie 1982 and Kreiser 2001 
have argued that we should conceive of Frege’s philosophical endeavours as 
embedded in the contexts of Neo-Kantian movements in 19th century Germany. 
But there is little evidence that Frege was in any personal or professional contact 
with the different schools of Neo-Kantianism flourishing around him.2
On linguistic issues, Frege was to remain plainly, and apparently deliberately 
ignorant throughout his whole career. There are practically no references in 
Frege’s writings to linguists.3 Frege seems to have been unaware of the fact that 
intense discussions on all kinds of linguistic issues were conducted around him. 
The linguistic turn in philosophy may have been a characteristic feature of the 
20th century; however, 19th century Germany prided itself on having transformed 
the study of language into a scientific discipline with deep repercussions on the 
internal structure of other sciences. 
Recent research has shown that Frege in some cases has been reluctant to 
disclose his sources. Dummett has found clear indications that Frege in his 
Kernsätze zur Logik involves in a rather detailed discussion with the introduction 
to Lotze’s Logik, without, however, mentioning neither book nor author.4 
Likewise, Picardi, elaborating a surmise originally due to Currie,5 has established 
beyond doubt that Frege, for a thought experiment conducted in his article Der 
Gedanke,6 leaned tacitly on an illustration from Mach’s famous critic of the Ego 
in Analyse der Empfindungen (1886). 
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Studying Frege from the viewpoint of historical and theoretical linguistics, I 
have found in Frege’s writings similar, if, perhaps, less clear-cut traces of foreign 
material that Frege, for whatever reasons, may have chosen to present as his 
own. What I have happened to have picked up I shall duly report, but it must be 
emphasised that the principal aim of the present article lies beyond what can be 
documented by positive evidence. The thematic focus of my interest is on 
Frege’s repeated attempts to determine the influence of language, and in 
particular grammar, on logic. Frege carved out for himself a highly personal view 
of how logic and language could be interconnected, but he did so almost 
exclusively by means of discursive and conceptual categories that were all parts 
of intellectual mainstream debates in 19th century Germany. I am not going to 
argue that Frege knew much of these debates. In most cases, he probably did 
not.7 What I want to show is that Frege, in his investigations, followed trends 
and patterns that we today recognise as typical of 19th century thought. I do not 
thereby want to dispute the originality of Frege’s efforts, although I do believe 
that there still is a general tendency to exaggerate his philosophical ingenuity.8 
My motives lie elsewhere. 
I want to claim for Frege a unique position in the development of the tradition 
known as language criticism (see below). Reservations towards the intellectual 
reliability of language are as old as reflection over language itself. However the 
striking novelty that Frege brought to this tradition was the precision necessary 
for actually testing the claims of language criticism. With Frege, decidability at 
last became an option in linguistic debates and descriptions. Ironically, language 
was never a main issue for Frege. For that reason perhaps, he relied on existing 
concepts and theories when addressing linguistic questions. I shall try first to 
establish the linguistic context in which Frege wrote, and then show how Frege 
used the material at his disposal for framing a highly precise view of language. 
Since Frege, in my interpretation, arrived at a rigorous model of language, I shall 
conclude my investigation by offering a simplified exposition of the linguistic 
reasons why Frege ended up embracing the sceptical branch of language 
criticism. Thus, two motives prompt my presentation, a historical and a 
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2. LANGUAGE CRITICISM (SPRACHKRITIK)9
The idea of a conflict between logic and language surfaces in most of Frege’s 
writings on logico-linguistic issues. So, for instance, in the early notes on Logik,10 
dating somewhere between 1879 and 1891: 
[…] the business of the logician consists in a continuous 
fight against psychological elements and, partly, against 
language [Sprache] and grammar, namely in so far as the 
latter fails to properly express the logical element11
 
or in the article Der Gedanke from 1918/19: 
Thus [because of the metaphoricity of language] a fight with 
language arises, forcing me to deal with language although 
my business here is different12
 
or in a late note on mathematics and language: 
Therefore, a major part of the philosopher’s work consists in 
– or should consist in – a fight with language.13
 
That Frege came to think of language and cognition (science, philosophy or 
logic) in terms of conflict and fight may have been caused by professional 
experiences with language, but the attitude was by no means restricted to 
mathematicians grown sceptical of words. In the wake of Kant’s philosophy, 
German thinkers had begun speculating whether Kant had not failed to point to 
the right place when arguing the pre-structuring of man’s cognition. With 
Herder and Hamann a German tradition for maintaining that speech and 
language be considered the genuine apriority of cognition arose. In the 19th 
century, this tradition for language criticism (Sprachkritik) was to become an 
intellectual position linking figures like Reinhold and Gruppe over Hermann 
and Gerber with Nietzsche and Mauthner. During the century, a noticeable shift 
in outlook took place. Whereas Reinhold and Gruppe, both writing before 1850, 
expressed an optimistic view of man’s capacity for bringing the unruliness of 
language (speech) under cognitive control, scepticism grew as the century drew 
to an end. Around 1900, neither Nietzsche nor Mauthner were ready to place 
much faith in the powers of cognition. 
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Especially the lines connecting Gruppe with Mauthner are of interest to the 
Frege scholar.14 Not only did Mauthner publish the writings of Gruppe, he also 
took from Gruppe his central concern.15 How can we, both asked, investigate 
language for its impact on thought and cognition when that very same 
investigation has to be carried out by means of language?16 But whereas Gruppe, 
in 1834, could feel confident that the fight against language could be won, 
Mauthner, in 1901, saw no other possibility than to declare cognition finally 
defeated by language. 
Frege was to experience a similar sobering. In Begriffsschrift (1879) Frege speaks as 
if philosophy could indeed accomplish the task of breaking 
the sway of the word over the human spirit by exposing the 
conceptual fallacies that usage [Sprachgebrauch] almost 
inevitably creates.17
 
At the end of his career, a more disillusioned Frege speaks. In a late remark he 
explicitly confronts the same problem as that which Gruppe had set out to 
unravel and Mauthner despaired of solving: 
Our investigations are particularly difficult because we tend 
to be misled by language, language which is indispensable 
to us while investigating. One might think that one had to 
start by liberating language of all logical imperfections 
before using language in such investigations. However, the 
work needed to do so can only be done with the help of the 
imperfect tool of language.18
 
And this work, Frege admitted shortly before dying, is likely to be in vain: 
It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to test any expression that 
language offers us for logical qualities.19
 
Did Frege know of the Gruppe-Mauthner connection? Around mid-century, 
most educated Germans were familiar with the leading tenets of Trendelenburg’s 
philosophy. At one place, Frege refers directly to Trendelenburg in his writings.20 
But Frege may, in addition to Trendelenburg’s “climatic” influence7, have been 
encouraged by Lotze, Frege’s teacher in Göttingen, to go over Tredelenburg’s 
Logische Untersuchungen from 1840.21 Had Frege done so, he would, in the second 
volume of Trendelenburg’s logical treatise, have read a praise of Gruppe for 
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having, in his Wendepunkte der Philosophie im 19. Jahrhundert (1834), shown by 
means of linguistic analysis that the judgement is prior to the concept.22 We 
don’t know whether Frege ever came in contact with Gruppe’s writings. But he 
certainly would have consented to Gruppe’s characterisation of the relationship 
between language and thinking (Denken): 
Between both a kind of reciprocity obtains that has never 
been appreciated in its full extension and in all its 
consequences.23
 
Gruppe’s book, Wendepunkte, is devoted to doing what, according to Gruppe, has 
never been done before. He felt certain that he had found a way of breaking the 
sway of language over philosophy. Hence the optimistic title of his book, 
Wendepunkte der Philosophie (Turning Points of Philosophy). 
The actual course of Gruppe’s investigation may strike a present reader as 
slightly naïve. Speech, Gruppe thinks, works by metaphor and comparison.24 
However, by empirical analysis of speech, we may succeed in neutralising its 
effects and so arrive at language independent regularities of thought (Denken). 
Gruppe is conscious of the fact that language must play a double part in his 
book: both as object studied and as instrument of study, but no attempt is made 
in his investigations at determining and controlling speech by means of precise 
analysis. What he offers instead reads as a rather traditional philosophical text 
which slowly transforms into a detailed historical interpretation of Aristotle. 
Mauthner may have realised the shortcomings of Gruppe’s analysis. At least, he 
is convinced of the futility marking, as he thinks, all attempts at analysing 
language with language. His Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache, albeit rich in 
illuminating details, is from start to end suffused with the pessimistic certainty 
that the need to use language for criticising language must by necessity distort 
its object. Mauthner therefore came to the conclusion that language can never 
become an object of cognition. Instead, he looked to mysticism for a solution of 
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3. FREGE’S MODEL OF LANGUAGE 
Frege shared most of the psychological beliefs of his century. He seems to have 
subscribed to a modified version of Mach’s empirio-criticism.25 As far as the 
psychological side of man is concerned, man is secluded in his strictly subjective 
inner life. From his first logical sketch to the concluding remarks of Der Gedanke 
in Logische Untersuchungen, Frege was to entertain the belief that the 
psychological part of man “in no two persons can be identical”.26 “No two 
persons can ever share the same mental image (Vorstellung)”.27 But Frege felt that 
this could not be the whole story. If there was nothing more to man that what 
psychology tells us, scepticism would follow. Scientific knowledge would be an 
illusion. And that, Frege strongly felt, must be an impossible conclusion. 
Two considerations may have motivated Frege in taking up his opposition 
against psychologism. We know that Frege, the mathematician, had been led 
into logic by experiencing the shortcomings of his native German when used for 
professional purposes.28 The writing of Begriffsschrift had been triggered by the 
wish to develop a more reliable professional language. However, in addition to 
this practical motivation, Frege entertained a more speculative belief. As 
indicated above, Frege shared with the language critics of his time the idea of a 
conflict obtaining between cognition and language. Until his final surrender to 
pessimism, Frege was to entertain the belief that logic would prove the key to a 
solution of that conflict. Frege was convinced that language must contain a 
logical core: 
Grammar is to speech what logic is to thought, but in 
grammar psychological elements are mixed up with logical 
elements.29 
 
So, Frege believed, the conflict could be solved if one managed to cleanse 
grammars of their psychological impurities. A purified language would be the 
proof that scepticism was wrong. It was an empirical fact that man had the 
ability to acquire real objective knowledge. And to Frege, it was to remain 
obvious that it was the logical part of language that provided man with that 
ability. If it had not been for the logical part of language, man would have had 
no window on knowledge. In Über die wissenschaftliche Berechtigung einer 
Begriffsschrift (1882), Frege informs us that we cannot form a concept unless we 
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find means of denoting it with signs.30 At the end of his career, Frege was to 
repeat his belief in the importance of language: 
In order for man to grasp thoughts it is necessary that the 
thought combines with a sentence in our consciousness.31
 
So, Frege brought two components to his fight against scepticism: the language 
critical belief in the high importance of language in epistemological affairs and 
the mathematician’s knack for analysing expressions in a completely rigorous 
fashion. Armed with this equipment, Frege embarked on his campaign to 
dismantle the claims of his opponents. Frege did not try to turn his opposition 
towards the psychologism of his time into a philosophical system. Given Frege’s 
philosophic innocence, perhaps we should be glad he did not.32 Instead, he tried 
to define a special way of thinking and writing about logico-linguistic affairs 
that he felt would prove a workable alternative. It will be convenient to speak of 
Frege’s collected beliefs as if constituting a model of how language functions. 
However, to Frege what I call “model” was reality. Frege believed himself to be 
speaking directly of what things in some logico-linguistic world were really like. 
Being well aware of the logical insufficiencies of his native German, Frege 
decided around 1890 to develop a special terminology with which to speak of 
this reality (model). The terminology is best explained in Über Sinn und Bedeutung 
(1892),33 but seems to have been in place already in 1891.34
Frege invented neither model, nor terminology. Rather, both may be seen as 
specialisations or refinements of ideas and professional vocabularies circulating 
in the linguistic community of 19th century Germany. It is uncertain what Frege 
knew about the discussions going on around him. As previously stated, he 
probably knew little. But nevertheless, Frege’s work neatly mirrors contemporary 
efforts to model and describe language. It seems as if Frege first decided to 
become explicit on linguistic issues in the late 1880s. Whether he was 
influenced to do so by the rich literature on language appearing in the same 
decade, we do not know.35 Echoes may have reached Frege brooding in Jena over 
the new logic for his Grundgesetze. Before 1890, Frege’s linguistic commitment is 
either subtle or inconclusive. In Begriffsschrift, as well as in the articles defending 
it,36 Frege sporadically buttresses up a mostly logical argumentation with 
linguistic examples. One may read the Grundlagen der Arithmetik as an implicit 
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meditation on the logical consequences of the definite article in German.37 But 
we have to wait for the publication of the decisive articles in 1891-9238 until 
Frege chooses to confront the language issue directly. 
In most German schools between 1840 and 1880, elementary grammar was 
being taught according to the system developed by Karl Ferdinand Becker. Also 
young Frege seems to have been trained to conceive of the grammar of his 
native language by the Becker system.39 Frege never seems to have felt the need 
to subsequently subject his grammatical school training to a critical scrutiny. 
Like most non-linguists writing about language, Frege must have been confident 
that school teaching sufficed for later in life engaging in intellectual discussions 
about grammar.40
In the historiography of linguistics, Becker’s accomplishments are well 
described.41 On the one hand, he renewed the tradition of logical, or rational 
grammar. On the other, he revolutionised the established conception of 
grammar in Germany. The first part made him the target of severe criticism from 
the dominant schools of linguistic thought in Germany.42 The second part made 
him the founding figure of German school grammar in the 19th century. When 
Becker died in 1849, his rational grammar was slowly growing into scientific 
disrepute. Until the 1880s, when a noticeable shift in German linguistics took 
place, historical and psychological linguistics totally dominated in Germany. 
However, it is interesting to notice that transitory misfortune in science did not 
stop Becker’s grammatical system from making its way into most German school 
grammars.43
Until Becker’s publications, German grammar (like most European grammars) 
had been constructed around the concept of word classes.44 A sentence is built 
up from contributions of elements from these classes. Such had been the 
accepted wisdom in grammar since antiquity.45 Becker turned grammar upside 
down. The sentence, not the word, is the starting point of grammar. Grammar 
deals with sentential analysis, not with the synthesis of a sentence from 
components. This view-point made syntax the most important part of grammar. 
Becker’s school grammar was a syntax, teaching pupils how to split the sentence 
into its syntactical constituents. 
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The sentence, Becker held, made the outer appearance of thought possible. 
Language had no other mission than to serve as the embodiment of thought. 
Furthermore, thought was primarily logical. By logic, Becker did not mean any 
specific system, let alone a formal structure. What Becker had in mind, was 
something which he sometimes called the “inner meaning” (innere Bedeutung)46 
of language. The inner meaning is the same to all mankind.47 Naturally, Becker 
was aware of the differences separating the grammars of the natural languages. 
But every grammar, he held, contained the same basic syntax. This syntax was 
the accurate mirror of one and the same “logic” common to all mankind. 
Frege seems to have taken in most of Becker’s teachings. Like Becker, Frege held 
the sentence to be prior to its parts.48 Words, or syntactical constituents, may 
express concepts and relations, but these are to be discovered by sentential 
analysis. They have neither existence nor meaning outside the sentential 
structure.49 Like Becker, Frege insisted that the sentence mirrors, or expresses a 
thought. Both were convinced that negations are special kinds of thoughts. The 
negated thought does not consist of a full thought with a negation part added, 
but is a complete thought in its own right.50 And most important perhaps: like 
Becker, Frege assumed all natural languages to contain one and the same logical 
system. The syntax, both believed, was the right place to look for this alleged 
system. 
The foundations of Becker’s syntax are metaphysical.51 Structurally, the sentence 
is like a hierarchical tree with only two branches on every knot. The relationship 
between two branches going out from the same knot is one of subordination. 
Becker interprets the subordination either in terms of generality (the superior) 
and specificity (the subordinate), or of activity (the superior) and being (the 
subordinate). The first division of the sentence is that between subject and 
predicate. The predicate denotes, or expresses52 the general concept, which is also 
the concept of activity; the subject expresses being in its specificity. In the 
sentence the subject is subordinated to the predicate. 
Apart from its metaphysical character, Becker’s syntax is still far from satisfying 
the needs of a keen, mathematical mind. Frege explicitly tells us of his 
dissatisfaction with the concepts of “subject” and “predicate”,53 and suggests that 
they be supplanted with those of “argument” and “function”. But once 
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equipped with the tools of functional theory, Frege is able to transform Becker’s 
system into a genuine formal logic. Next to Becker’s division into subject and 
predicate follow two divisions: the subject divides into subject and attribute, the 
predicate into predicate and object.54 We find Frege handling the former in for 
instance Funktion und Begriff when analysing “the capital of the German Reich”;55 
the second division is being taken care of by means of functions of more than 
one argument.56
In Becker’s system, any subject, or object may further divide into attribute and 
subject/object. Finally, we may distinguish between two kinds of objects: one 
directly connected to the verb, another connected by means of an adverb 
(thereby forming an adverbial).57 Subordinate clauses are to be treated as 
syntactical constituents of the main clause, that is as subjects, attributes, or 
objects (or adverbials). Since direct objects and subjects coalesce when appearing 
in the grammatical form of the subordinate clause, Becker is led to distinguish 
between three kinds of subordinate clauses according as their syntactical role is 
that of an attribute, a subject/object or an adverbial. In the terminology of the 
grammarian Götzinger (1839)58 Becker’s distinctions appear as Beisatz (as 
attribute), Nennsatz (as subject/object), and Adverbsatz (as adverbial), that is as 
the three kinds of subordinate clauses known to Frege in Über Sinn und 
Bedeutung. 
Finally, before leaving Becker, one could speculate on a certain similarity 
between the metaphysical frameworks of Becker and Frege. There have been 
some attempts to explain Frege’s fundamental belief in the existence of two 
kinds of entities: objects and functions (concepts).59 Especially, the definition of 
a function as an unsatisfied entity has puzzled some of Frege’s readers.60 Also 
Becker believed the universe to consist of two basic kinds of entities: those that 
had being in themselves, and those that had being only as activities directed 
against other entities. In these stipulations one may surmise echoes of Becker’s 
occupation with Aristotle who, in his Categories, makes the fundamental 
distinction between a primary substance (ουσια πρωτη) and what can be said 
about the specimens of this substance (that is, specimens represented by the 10 
famous categories). If Frege was a Platonist, as many have claimed32, he was 
certainly an Aristotelian Platonist. 
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In 1855, Becker’s rational grammar was subjected to a scorching criticism from 
the leading spokesman of the new psychologically inspired linguistics, Heymann 
Steinthal. For more than 30 years, Steinthal and his school61 were to dominate 
linguistic thought in Germany. Steinthal wanted to transform the study of 
language into a strictly scientific discipline. The only way to do so, he believed, 
was to provide the craft with a firm psychological underpinning of their doings. 
During the 19th century, psychology witnessed an unprecedented height in 
intellectual prestige. Most intellectuals looked to psychology as the fundamental 
discipline of science and philosophy. In psychology the Herbart School 
dominated.62 To Herbart psychology was a science as strictly causal as physics, 
only ruled by some different set of laws. The soul was a reality, conceptualised as 
an inner space consisting uniquely of certain dynamic interacting forces, known 
as “mental images” (Vorstellungen). In Herbartian psychology all mental activity 
could be explained by reference to mental images. Also higher forms of mental 
life such as speaking (Sprechen) and thinking (Denken) could be explained as 
special kinds or constellations of an underlying image formation (Vorstellen). 
Steinthal fully accepted the basic lines of Herbart’s psychology. He made the 
term “mental image” (Vorstellung) the central constituent in his description of 
the linguistic activity. Also Frege seems to have been attentive to the new winds 
blowing. In Begriffsschrift Frege’s use of “mental image” (Vorstellung) and cognate 
expressions is vague and non-specific. The formal expression “-A”, for instance, 
is said to evoke a mental image in the reader (BS, 2); the content of the word 
“house” is called a “mental image” (BS, 2); the number 20, Frege tells us, renders 
an independent mental image (BS, 17) and so on. In Grundlagen Frege has learnt 
to distinguish between mental images “in a subjective sense”, pertaining to 
psychology, and mental images “in an objective sense”, pertaining to logic 
(GLA, 59). And after the grand revision around 1890, we find Frege using 
“mental image” only as a general term of anything that “moves” in man’s inner 
life, which is precisely as Steinthal had taught the linguistic community to use 
the word. 
Frege drew another consequence from Steinthal’s psychological linguistics than 
Steinthal did himself. As indicated above, Frege came to the conclusion that 
everything in language reflecting mental images eluded scientific scrutiny.63 To 
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Frege there could be no science of mental images. If man was to overcome the 
limitations of his inner subjective life, he had to turn to logic. Given his psycho-
scientific outlook, Steinthal, of course, held the opposite position. 
Steinthal had criticised Becker’s idea of a logical grammar64 by reproducing an 
ancient argument against this conception. The fact that there are different 
languages, each with its own specific grammar, but only one logic common to 
all mankind, is the empirical proof that grammar cannot be logical. What 
Steinthal had failed to see was that Becker had actually managed to indicate how 
this old empirical argument could be successfully countered on its own ground. 
Becker’s syntactical reformulation of grammar could be read as a first step in that 
direction. If something like a common syntactical “deep structure” (not Becker’s 
word) could be detected in each and every language, the diversity of languages 
(and their grammars) would be no argument against rational grammar. Of 
course, for this “deep structure” to be logical in nature, one would need a second 
argument. The existence of a common syntax would only guarantee that 
mankind shared a common structure of speech, not that this structure was 
logical.65 Becker does not seem to have been aware that a second argument was 
needed. He simply supposed thought to be logical by nature. 
Frege may, or may not have known Steinthal’s work.66 But he certainly adopted 
his own terminology to the new standards of psycho-linguistics. However, of 
more consequence to his model of language, was the concept that Steinthal had 
devoted his book Grammatik, Logik und Psychologie (1855) to clarify: 
The greatest inspiration I received from Humboldt’s concept 
of an inner form of language. The present book is nothing 
but the explanation of this concept.67
 
Steinthal is famous for having made Humboldt’s concept of an inner form a vital 
and recurrent issue of German linguistics.68 For almost a century, “inner form” 
was to remain a theoretical question on which it was compulsory for German 
linguists and language theorists to take a professional stand.69
One cannot say that the concept was clarified in the progress. The leading idea 
was that of a specific linguistic intermediary or bond between observable sound 
structures and meanings. The observable side of language gave rise to the study 
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of etymology, morphology and syntax (often referred to as the outer form of 
language). What meanings were was to remain a more obscure issue.70 
Simplifying matters (and terminology) greatly; one might say that the meaning 
side of language embraced at least three kinds of phenomena: 
1. The mental images believed to be happening in the soul during speech. 
2. The concepts and relations mostly conceptualised as higher forms of 
mental images. 
3. The entities referred to by means of speech. 
 
Between these different phenomena of meaning, not always carefully 
distinguished, and sounds a special structure or bond, called “inner form”, was 
assumed to be existing. 
With Humboldt, the motivating factor for stipulating the existence of an inner 
form of language was inter-linguistic. He realised that each language impresses 
upon its users a specific way of experiencing and categorising meaning (a 
Weltansicht), and suggested the name of “inner form” for this kind of 
categorisation. It was (and is) uncertain whether Humboldt had wanted to 
sustain a radical form of linguistic relativism, or whether he had assumed the 
existence of universal grammatical and logical categories. Some, like Wundt, 
argued the former, others, like Marty, the latter. But whatever the opinion, 
discussions were conducted on the inter-linguistic premises originally due to 
Humboldt. 
In this respect, Steinthal’s treatment stands out as an exception.71 Steinthal 
realised that there was an intra-linguistic aspect to inner form as well. Different 
languages offer different ways of conceptualising meaning. But much the same, 
he felt, could be said about the linguistic means (the outer form) provided by 
one language only. In the first tome of his Abriss der Sprachwissenschaft (18812), 
he gave three explanations of how an inner form develops and functions within 
one language. To the Frege scholar only the third is of interest.72 Consider, 
Steinthal says, different German words like Grab, Gruft and Grube. What such 
synonyms show is that “the same object may be apperceived by means of 
various words in multiple ways. This difference is the inner form of language”.73
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Frege’s reasons for introducing the category of “sense” into his model of 
language are well-known. He had wondered how to give a satisfying description 
of identity, the logician’s analogue of synonymy. The solution, found around 
1890, was the introduction of sense, the perhaps most contested concept of 
Frege’s model. It is fairly obvious what Frege wants his new category to yield. It 
is more dubious whether Frege ever managed to give a complete consistent 
explanation of what to understand by “sense”.74 The crux of the matter is his 
“definition” of sense as manner of givenness (Art des Gegebenseins (KS, 143-44), 
“wie der, die oder das durch ihn [den Namen] Bezeichnete gegeben ist” (KS, 
350)). A sign, Frege tells us, is connected not only to its referent, but also to a 
special way of presenting a referent to us. 
Frege’s favourite examples are geometrical (KS, 144), but it is clear that Frege 
believed sense to be closely bound up with language. The sense of a name, he 
tells us in Über Sinn und Bedeutung, will be comprehended (erfasst) by anyone 
knowing the language to which the sense belongs (der er [der Sinn] angehört) (KS, 
144). In a perfect language, all users would connect the same signs with the 
same senses (KS, 144). However, in our more imperfect world, all we can hope 
for is that the context of speech will enable us to disambiguate differences in 
sense (KS, 145). 30 years later, in Der Gedanke, Frege elaborates on the linguistic 
aspect of sense. One may imagine, Frege says, two individuals using exactly the 
same signs or expressions, differing, however, in the senses they connect with 
their shared signs. These two individuals will not speak the same language.75
From the wording of the latter example, one might believe that Frege tries to 
define a language by reference to some specific structure of sense shared by only 
those that speak the language. That would have made Frege share the opinion of 
Wundt. But Frege wants us to draw a different conclusion. The stratum of sense 
exists independently of man and will therefore be the same to all mankind. 
Therefore, what defines a language cannot be some specificity of sense. There is 
no such thing as a specificity of sense. Neither can we define a language by its 
expressions alone. As we just heard, two individuals may very well use identical 
expressions and still fail to speak the same language. So, the definiens of 
language must be a matter of how expressions connect with sense. Of course, no 
two existing languages combine expressions with senses in the same way. Hence 
there are different languages (KS, 144). But even what we would normally refer 
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to as one language, say the German language, may very well prove to consist of 
many different languages (KS, 349). 
So language is defined by the nature of the bond that exists between the outer 
expressions of language and the universal realm of sense. This conclusion is 
corroborated by other explanations Frege offered of sense. In an answer to 
Jourdain Frege wrote that our ability to understand new sentences in a language 
depends on some underlying structure of sense (WB, 127). Language and sense 
interact, or, as Frege explicitly tells us in his Aufzeichnungen für Ludwig 
Darmstaedter (1919) in connection with an analysis of a specific sentence: 
To this analysis of the sentence an analysis of the thought 
[that is, the sense] that is thereby expressed corresponds (NS, 
275). 
 
In a language, the structure of expressions is mapped on to the structure of sense 
which again is mapped to the referents. The latter mapping, however, is 
irrelevant to language. What defines a language is the way in which expressions 
and senses are connected. 
Frege’s idea of what constitutes a language is certainly on a par with the 
linguistic conception of an inner form. Basically, language is a bond between 
tangible expressions and certain invisible entities (be they senses, mental images 
or something else). We don’t know how much or little Frege knew of these 
linguistic debates, but if we accept to consider Frege’s idea of a connection 
between expressions and senses as either influenced by, or structurally similar to 
contemporaneous discussions of the linguistic inner form, we must realise that 
Frege’s approach differs in intention from what professional linguists were trying 
to achieve: Frege were not out to identify some inner form within the 
historically and empirically given languages. He did not share the linguists’ 
concern for distinguishing a middle realm between sounds and meanings in 
some specific language. Frege wanted to distil a logical part in language. He 
considered every existing language a mixture of psychologically and logically 
motivated constituents. So his interest was entirely focussed on the logical side 
of language.76 If Frege was looking for anything like an inner form of language, 
then this stipulated element was to do service as an important ally in his fight 
for a logically cleansed language. 
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Frege had other motivations for stipulating the category of sense than the one 
just stated. He also believed that sense would be a useful instrument when 
analysing indirect or oblique speech. He further held sense to yield a good 
explanation of what we do when speaking without denoting, or referring 
intentions, be it in reasoning, or, as Frege was fond of saying, in poetry. In the 
former case, our use is serious and legitimate. We merely suspend asserting while 
hypothesising.77 In the latter case, we engage in more playful or artistic usage.78 
One may also mention the importance of sense to Frege’s theory of negation, or 
to his psychological theory of grasping. Frege often seems to have resorted to the 
category of sense when otherwise short on arguments. No wonder, perhaps, that 
Frege felt ultimately driven to provide his senses with the metaphysical housing 
of a third realm. 
By 1890 Frege had at his disposal a model of language and logic that in terms of 
clarity and simplicity was superior to anything the crafts of linguistics or logic 
could muster. We do not know whether Frege, in the revision of his early logic, 
was inspired by the rich development of linguistic theories taking place in the 
1870s and especially the 1880s. We have seen him adopt the vocabulary of 
psycho-linguistics, and I have argued that Frege’s idea of sense could be seen as a 
logician’s specification of inner form. There are some indications that Frege 
knew when he departed from standard usage, which he must then have known. 
He thinks it worth while to explain that he uses the word “thought” in an 
unusual way (KS 148, NS 138, 147), and he seems aware of the dangers that one 
might conflate his new category of sense with concepts.79 Below, when 
presenting a brief outline of Frege’s model, I shall give a few more indications 
that Frege used existing material for his reshuffling of logical analysis. 
In short, Frege’s model of language may be described as follows.80 Within every 
language a logical syntax may be discovered. The elements of this syntax Frege 
took from Becker’s grammar and from functional theory. In Begriffsschrift Frege 
gave a brief outline of how such a syntax could be empirically discovered. 
Although not originally developed for linguistic purposes, the technique was 
later sporadically applied to the analysis of language.81 There are three basic 
categories of logical syntax: that of value expressions, that of function 
expressions and that of proper names. Then there is the auxiliary category of 
argument expressions. An argument expression is either a value expression, a 
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function expression or a proper name. Logical language comes in sentences. 
Every sentence is a value expression. It can be analysed into function and 
argument expressions. Functions expressions never allow of further analysis; 
argument expressions, not themselves functions expressions, sometimes do. 
The basic categories of the logical syntax are mapped – in a one-to-one fashion – 
on to the structure of sense. By this mapping all linguistic elements connected to 
mental images disappear.82 The structure of syntax being isomorphic to the 
structure of sense, we have the same type of basic constituents at the level of 
sense as at the level of syntax. To the sentence the thought corresponds. Also to 
the function expressions, to those value expressions that are not sentences and 
to the proper names special constituents of sense (with no specific names) 
correspond. Since argument expressions are syntactically ambiguous, they are 
mapped on to the level of sense according as they are proper names, value 
expressions or function expressions. Finally, we have the domain of what Frege 
called Bedeutungen. 
There have been some discussions over Frege’s choice of the word Bedeutung 
(and over what could be the proper translation). With one important 
qualification Tugendhat is right in emphasising 
the puzzlement which every German reader experiences 
with this word [i.e. Bedeutung] when first reading Frege’s 
essay Über Sinn und Bedeutung.83
 
No doubt, Frege’s use of Bedeutung is at odds with present German usage, but less 
so, I think, with the usage of his own time. In 19th century Germany, Bedeutung 
was a freely floating term covering anything one might think to be connected 
with the use of linguistic expressions (see my comments on meaning above). 
Moreover, the combination Sinn und Bedeutung (in that order) seems to have had 
an almost idiomatic status. One finds it, for instance, in Gruppe’s Antäus;84 
Grimm uses the idiom in the fourth part of his Deutsche Grammatik (1837).85 Also 
after Frege, the idiom is used by authors who most certainly were ignorant of 
Frege’s work.86 Frege is hardly to be credited for having invented the 
constellation. 
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Whatever Frege’s reasons for choosing the word Bedeutung, his intentions with 
the word seem clear. With Bedeutung Frege denotes those entities of his model 
that we today call “referents” (or “denotations”). The strict isomorphism 
obtaining between the basic categories of syntax and sense does not extend to 
the level of referents.87 First, expressions and senses are mapped in a many-to-
one fashion to referents. And further, the domain of referents is divided not into 
three basic categories, but only into two: the category of objects and the 
category of functions. The category of objects contains, as an important sub-
class, the sub-category of truth values with two members only: Truth and Falsity. 
Sentences and thoughts are mapped to these two members. All other value 
expressions together with all proper names (and their respective senses) are 
mapped to objects outside the sub-category of truth values.88 Function 
expressions (and their senses) are mapped to members of the category of 
functions. These members are either concepts or proper functions, according as 
they give truth values or not as values. The mapping between expressions and 
referents Frege conceives of as a naming relation. So, all expressions are names. 
For the mapping between senses and referents Frege has no special terminology, 
but by the isomorphism between syntax and sense, the latter mapping must 
copy the structure of the naming relation between expressions and referents. 
Some interpreters have taken Frege to task for his believing all expressions to be 
names.89 They feel that it is wrong to speak of concept expressions as names of 
concepts. I shall not enter the discussion of which usage would be more 
appropriate in modern logic. However, in 19th century Germany, Frege’s usage 
was well accepted. It prospered in the philosophy known as nominism 
developed in the 1870s and 1880s by Ludwig Noiré and Max Müller.90 According 
to Müller; the activity of thinking involves four kinds of material: sensations 
(Empfindungen), mental images (Vorstellungen), concepts (Begriffe) and names 
(Namen). All words (and expressions) are names of concepts. Hence the name 
Nominism. 
Frege was no nominist. He was no follower of Müller’s philosophy. But he did 
accept to model all expressions as names, just as he, like Müller, had no scruples 
thinking of concepts as referents. One may therefore detect, in Frege’s model (as 
well as in Müller’s nominism), a tension between nominalistic and realistic 
tendencies (in the mediaeval sense).91 Words name, but they do not name 
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objects only as a traditional nominalist would demand. They also name 
concepts (as the nominist assumed). And moreover, to every object and concept 
one or more senses, endowed with objective existence, are related. So, Frege’s 
nominalistic model does present rich material for realistic interpretations of 
both mediaeval and modern kind.92
4. LANGUAGE CRITICISM SYNTACTICALLY REVISITED 
Frege believed that every language must contain a logical syntax. Until he finally 
succumbed to scepticism, he even believed that it would be possible to detect 
and use such a syntax in the service of science. To that end he constructed his 
model of language and logic. As I have been trying to demonstrate, the model 
was constructed out of conceptions well-established in the linguistic 
communities of 19th century Germany. Much the same can be said about the 
terminology that Frege devised for speaking about his model. 
With his model Frege was able to counter the traditional argument against 
logical or rational grammar. If one can detect in every existing language one and 
the same syntactical “deep structure”, then the Babylonian variety of language is 
in itself no argument against the programme of a logical syntax. To Frege 
matters were clear. Either such a syntax could be found and used, or scientific 
knowledge was Utopian dreaming. By his affinity to Becker Frege enters the long 
European tradition of rational grammar. He heightens the ambitions of the 
tradition by insisting that the successful implementation of a rational grammar 
is a necessary condition to the possibility of gaining genuine knowledge. And 
more important: Frege adds to the idea of a rational grammar a hitherto 
unknown degree of logical (mathematical) precision. 
In linguistic affairs, precision is often conclusive. Due to the rigour of his model, 
Frege found himself in the unique position of actually being able to test the 
traditional claims of logical grammar. We know that Frege’s interest in language 
was triggered by arguments current in the language criticism of his time. We also 
know that Frege ended up darkly embracing language scepticism. Between the 
two, a period of intense occupation with language and logic lies. 
In one of his latest notes Frege points to the reason why he finally gave in to 
scepticism: the difficulties of dealing with the definite article in German (the 
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main problem of GLA). This problem has engendered, Frege says, not only “the 
paradoxes of set theory […] which have destroyed set theory”, but also proved 
fatal to his own attempt at “providing for numbers a logical foundation”.93 It is 
interesting to notice that Frege chooses to tag the shortcomings of set theory on 
the same syntactical device as that which caused the downfall of his life work. 
And even more, of course, that he identifies syntax as the common decisive 
factor. 
By citing the definite article of German, Frege highlights a very special oddity 
which he discovered around 1890. It is first discussed in the article Über Begriff 
und Gegenstand (in 1892), and is known, in the literature, as Frege’s paradox.94 In 
brief, the so-called “paradox” emerges when one tries to nominalise a function 
expression. The paradox has received much attention in the Frege literature. 
Some have regarded the paradox a blatant absurdity proving that Frege’s model 
of language must be completely wrong,95 some have tried to remedy its fatal 
effects,96 and some have actually embraced it as a definite result with most 
thought-provoking consequences.97 Below, I shall try to explain why Frege held 
his paradox to be of interest to anyone working scientifically with language, be 
it linguistically, analytically or historically. But first, a brief presentation of the 
argument leading up to the paradox. 
In a logically cleansed language (English for instance), we may regard the 
definite article (“the”) as a nominalisation device. Let us assume, with Frege, 
that the definite article may be rendered as a function expression taking as 
argument expression some concept expression (“man” for instance) and giving 
for value a value expression (“the man”).98 Like any other value expression, “the 
man” must (when couched in some sentence) be mapped first on to some entity 
of sense, and then to some object. Value expressions always denote objects. But 
now, suppose we want to speak, in our precise language, not of objects, but of 
concepts (or other kinds of functions). 
Why should that be a problem? Before answering, let me first explain my use 
(standard, as I believe) of the colloquial phrase “speaking of” as used in the 
paragraph above. When we say “the man goes for a walk”, we speak of some 
definite (previously introduced) man. That is, what we speak of is what we 
denote by the argument expression. By the function expression we denote what 
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we will say of the entity we speak of. We know from our model that argument 
expressions may be of any kind: value expressions, proper names or functions 
expressions. So, there is nothing per se to prevent us from speaking of functions 
and concepts.  
The problem only arises the moment we want to do two things simultaneously: 
we want to speak of a concept (or a function) and we want to do so by means of 
our nominalisation device. Let me illustrate by means of Frege’s own favourite 
example why this double act causes troubles.99 Suppose we say “the concept 
horse is a concept”. As above, the definite article “the” combines with the 
concept expression “concept horse” to yield the value expression “the concept 
horse”. All value expressions denote objects. Hence “the concept horse” denotes 
an object. That is in itself a puzzling oddity. But when saying “the concept horse 
is a concept”, we add falsity to oddity, for what do we say? We say that some 
strange object (denoted by “the concept horse”) is a concept.100 But since objects 
and concepts are strictly separated in Frege’s model, no object can ever have the 
property of being a concept.101 So our sentence denotes Falsity (or the sentence is 
false, as most would prefer to say). What holds for this nominalisation of a 
concept expression, holds for all attempts to be using nominalisations of 
concept and function expressions. We can speak of all the concepts and 
functions we want, but when we nominalise them, we automatically deprive 
them of their “concept-” or “function-hood”. 
This may seem a minor problem. In most cases we may probably find alternative 
ways of phrasing our sentences.102 But there is one, specialised use of language in 
which the problem cannot be avoided, and that is when we apply language to 
itself. Whenever we find ourselves compelled to speak of those parts of language 
which are designed to occupy function position, we inevitable create the 
forbidden nominalisation. Normally, we may not notice what we are actually 
doing when using nominalised expressions in our linguistic descriptions. But 
when the precision of our descriptive language reaches the heights that Frege 
was the first if not to claim, then at least to climb, our descriptive resources start 
to fail us. Analysing the sentence “this rose is red”, Frege discovers the fatal blow 
that logic deals at anyone who tries to give a precise description of language: 
the grammatical predicate is red belongs to the subject this 
rose. In that sentence the words the grammatical predicate “is 
 22
FREGE – THE UNINTENTIONAL LINGUIST 
red” are not the grammatical predicate, they are the subject. 
It is precisely by calling the predicate predicate that we 
deprive it of the property of being a predicate”.103
 
Frege’s paradox arises from our wish (or need) to speak of language. There can be 
no precise meta-language that does not distort the object language it is designed 
to denote. When we try to speak of a language in a completely rigorous way, we 
inevitably produce false sentences. According to Frege, model theory had been 
flawed when model theory had been used to speak of itself (Cantor’s 
diagonalisation). Russell had used another version of the same kind of self-
reflexivity when discovering the fatal paradox in Frege’s Grundgesetze. And 
rational or logical grammar, Frege realised, would, for the very same reason, be 
prevented from developing into a complete precise science. The construction of 
a logically cleansed language seems to be limited by itself. That is why Frege 
finally found himself despairing (along with Wittgenstein and Mauthner) of the 
possibility of cleansing language with language: 
It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to test any expression that 
language offers us, for logical qualities.104
 
One may debate the importance of Frege’s paradox. Do results obtained in 
cleansed languages carry over to their natural cousins, or do they only hold 
within the formal restraints of a logical syntax? Does the ease with which we 
speak of language in a natural language deceive us, or may we waive aside results 
like Frege’s as a mere artificiality? To Sluga and Diamond, Frege’s results show 
(or even prove) that logical semantics can be no science in the strict sense of the 
word.105 But Frege, I think, was more ambitious. He believed that logic was the 
only valid answer to epistemic scepticism. Science is characterised by an ever 
increasing purification of language. The non-logical or psychological parts of 
language will dominate in poetry. “In mathematical, physical, chemical writing 
they will occur with lesser frequency than in the historical sciences.” For that 
reason, Frege adds, the humanistic sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) are closer to 
poetry than to the stricter sciences.106 However, for any discipline to become a 
real science, it must abandon the psychological aspects of language and make its 
use of language comply with the exigencies of some specific logical syntax. If 
science is to function in a reliable way, the language of science must adapt to 
logical criteria. But there is one prospective science which by its mere object is 
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prohibited from turning into real science. And that is the science of language. 
No occupation with language, Frege discovered, can overcome the difficulty 
arising from the traps of nominalisation. There can be no complete scientific 
meta-language of any object language.107 To Frege this result meant the end of 
his scientific career. We still do not know whether Frege is right. Perhaps, we do 
not need a rigorous description of our chosen professional language. However, 
the problem is before us and should interest anyone claiming precision for their 
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NOTES 
1 Also Dummett was to change his mind on Frege. In Dummett (1981), Frege is no 
longer a contemporary philosopher of language: 
An explicit adherence to the fundamental tenet of analytical 
philosophy thus cannot be claimed for Frege; but what can 
be claimed is that his philosophy of thought and of 
language leads almost inexorably in that direction. (54) 
That Dummett’s change of attitude toward Frege was also to move in the direction of a 
historical view becomes outspoken in Dummett (1991) which contains a number of 
articles discussing Frege’s work in the context of 19th century thought. 
2 There never was one unitary Neo-Kantian movement. The idea of advancing 
philosophy by going back to Kant flourished in many different areas of philosophy. In 
1916, the historian Oesterreich distinguishes, in his re-edition of Ueberweg’s Grundriss 
der Geschichte der Philosophie, between 6 different schools of Neo-Kantianism (a 
physiological, a metaphysical, a realistic, a logicist (The Marburger school), a value 
theoretical and a relativistic). 
3 In the unpublished paper Booles rechnende Logik und die Begriffsschrift (1880/81), in NS, 
9-52, Frege makes a brief allusion to the linguist A. H. Sayce who like Frege argued the 
primacy of the sentence over its parts (NS, 19). 
4 See Dummett’s “Frege’s ‘Kernsätze zur Logik’” in Dummett (1991: 65-78). Frege’s 
dependence on Lotze has likewise been discussed in Sluga (1980) and Kreiser (2001). To 
Sluga, Frege owes his so-called “paradox” (see below) to Lotze (Sluga 1980: 138). Kreiser 
suggests a rather different kind of dependence, focussing more on Lotze’s religious 
views than his logical (Kreiser 2001: 95ff). 
5 See Picardi (1996: 326f). The reference is to Currie (1982: 182). 
6 From 1918, in KS, 342-62. 
7 In GLA, Frege makes the remark that his view of numbers, although not actually 
current among mathematicians, nevertheless seem to be “lying in the air” (Sie scheinen 
mir in der Luft zu liegen) (GLA, 24). Much the same, I think, could be said about his 
views of language. The historiographer Koerner has repeatedly emphasised the 
importance of studying the kind of influence that also Frege is acknowledging with his 
reference. See Koerner 1989 on the reasons why the historical study of language needs 
to take “the climate of opinion” (85), the “spirit of the time” (der Geist der Zeiten 
(Goethe)) (61) into consideration. 
8 I more or less agree with the severe criticism that Baker & Hacker (1984) have launched 
against the philosophical qualities of Frege’s work; however, their eagerness for 
belittling the philosophical endeavours of Frege seems to have blinded them to other 
merits of Frege’s (his intellectual persistency for instance). To the controversy over 
Baker & Hacker (1984), see Dummett (1984), Baker & Hacker (1987) (modifying some 
of their criticism), and Dummett (1988). 
9 In German language, the modern conception of Sprachkritik seems to have originated 
with Hamann (see letter to Herder 7.7.1782)). For a brief introduction to the German 
tradition for language criticism, see Cloeren (1988). As Cloeren, I have chosen to 
translate Sprachkritik by language criticism. 
10 In NS, 1-8. 
11 NS, 7. All translations from Frege’s work are my own. Key words will be marked by 
being followed by the German original. 
12 KS, 350. 
13 Erkenntnisquellen der Mathematik und der mathematischen Naturwissenschaften (1924/25), 
in NS, 286-94, 289. 
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14 Sluga (1980) is to be credited with having for the first time brought the attention of 
Frege scholars to the possible importance of Gruppe for Frege. See Sluga (1980: 22ff). 
For a brief survey of Gruppe’s philosophy, see Cloeren (1988: 78-109). 
15 Mauthner also took from Gruppe the metaphor of natural language as a ladder that 
may be thrown away after climbing (in Gruppe 1831, excerpts of the book are found in 
Cloeren 1971: 47-60; here the ladder-metaphor 51-52). The metaphor was later to 
acquire fame through Wittgenstein’s Tractatus logico-philosophicus (1922). 
16 Gruppe (1834: 31); Mauthner (1901: 5). 
17 BS, xii. 
18 Tagebucheintragungen über den Begriff der Zahl (1924/25), in NS 284-85, 285. 
19 Erkenntnisquellen der Mathematik und der mathematischen Naturwissenschaften (1924/25), 
in NS, 286-94, 289. 
20 In BS, xi, Frege makes a brief mention of Trendelenburg (1846). 
21 For a similar conjecture, see Sluga (1980: 49). At the same place, Sluga even suggests 
that Frege might have taken the name for his Begriffsschrift from Lotze. See however 
Kreiser (2001: 153-169), for a detailed discussion of more plausible inspirations for 
Frege’s interest in pasigraphy. Both Sluga (1980) and Kreiser (2001) concur on ascribing 
to Trendelenburg, who had supervised Lotze’s dissertation, a lasting influence on 
Lotze’s views of logic. 
22 Gruppe (1834: 145f). 
23 Gruppe (1834: 28). 
24 In this respect, Gruppe’s work clearly antedates central aspects of Nietzsche’s language 
criticism. 
25 The discovery of Currie and Picardy (see note 5), together, of course, with Frege’s 
general view of knowledge, points to the position known today as empirio-criticism. 
Below, I shall argue that Frege may have arrived at this position by the intermediary of 
Steinthal’s psycho-linguistics. 
26 Logik (1879/91) NS, 1-8, 6. 
27 Der Gedanke (1918), KS, 342-62, 352. See also GLA 59-60. 
28 One finds a first indication of Frege’s alertness to the symbolic-linguistic side of the 
mathematical profession in his Rezension von: H. Seeger, Die Elemente der Arithmetik 
(1874), in KS, 85-86. 
29 Logik (1879/91), NS, 1-8, 6. 
30 In BS, 106-14, 107. 
31 Erkenntnisquellen der Mathematik und der mathematischen Naturwissenschaften (1924/25), 
in NS, 286-294, 288. 
32 It is symptomatic that those who have, in fact, tried to transform Frege’s scattered 
comments on matters of philosophy into a coherent system have failed to reach 
agreement on even the most basic issues. Did Frege conceive of himself as an 
epistemologist (such as argued by Sluga 1980 and Carl 1994), or as an ontologist 
(Dummett 1973, 1981 and 1991, and Wright 1983)? Was Frege a realist (Dummett 
1973, 1981, and 1991), a Platonist (Bell 1979, Wright 1983), a nominalist (Bergmann 
1958), or a transcendentalist (Sluga 1980, Currie 1982, Carl 1994 and Kreiser 2001)? As 
earlier stated (see note 8), I share the view of Baker & Hacker (1984) that philosophy 
was really not Frege’s strongest asset. But contrary to Baker & Hacker, I do not believe 
Frege’s philosophical ingenuousness a convincing argument against the overall 
importance of his achievements. 
33 In KS, 143-62. 
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34 Frege seems to have first mentioned his innovations in language related thought and 
terminology in the, now, famous letter to Husserl of 24.05.1891, in WB, 94-98. 
35 In Germany, the 1870s became known as the decade of the so-called 
“Junggrammarians”. However, in the 1880s a more speculative kind of linguistics 
flourished. Knobloch (1988), the most reliable and comprehensive study of German 
linguistics in the second half of the 19th century, suggests that many of the theories 
published around the 1880s could be characterised as a re-emergence of the tradition 
of rational grammar (Knobloch 1988: 401, 424, 434-438). Under this heading would 
certainly fall: Müller (1888) (a Becker redivivus to Knobloch 1988: 424), Noiré (1877), 
Gerber (1884), Wundt (1885), Marty (1884f) (with points later resumed in Marty 1908). 
Of a more pragmatic bent, perhaps, Wegener (1885) stands out. 
36 Booles rechnende Logik und die Begriffsschrift (1880/81), in NS, 9-52, Über den Zweck der 
Begriffsschrift (1882), in BS, 97-106, Über die wissenschaftliche Berechtigung einer 
Begriffsschrift (1882), in BS, 106-14, Booles logische Formelsprache und meine Begriffsschrift 
(1882), in NS, 53-59. 
37 One may, of course, also, and much more customarily so, read the Grundlagen as an 
investigation into the nature of numbers as in Wright (1983) for instance. 
38 Funktion und Begriff (1891), in KS, 125-42, Über Sinn und Bedeutung (1892), in KS, 143-
62, Über Begriff und Gegenstand (1892), in KS, 167-78. 
39 Unfortunately, the most complete life on Frege, Kreiser (2001), is tacit on Frege’s 
linguistic school training. Kreiser refers the reader to the school grammar produced by 
Frege’s father who was a school teacher. But there is little, apart from paternity, to 
suggest that Frege’s views of language were actually shaped by his father’s pedagogical 
efforts. 
40 As already Goethe noticed: 
Because every person knows how to speak, he also feels 
competent to speak about language (Ein jeder, weil er spricht, 
glaubt auch über die Sprache sprechen zu können). (Maximen 
und Reflexionen) 
Quoted from Sämtliche Werke I, 13: Sprüche in Prosa, Frankfurt am Main (1993). 
41 See, for instance, Glinz (1947), Haselbach (1966), Knobloch (1988) and Forsgren 
(1992). 
42 Becker was criticised both by Grimm, the most prominent member of the historical 
movement within German linguistics, and by Steinthal, the founder of psycho-
linguistics in Germany. 
43 For a comprehensive list of Becker’s work, see Haselbach (1966). Becker’s school 
grammar, Schulgrammatik der deutschen Sprache, was first published in 1831. 
44 Becker’s shift from morphology to syntax seems to have been influenced by 
Trendelenburg’s Aristotelianism with which he first became familiar around 1840, and 
so did not manifest itself until the second edition of Organism in 1841. 
45 The tradition for constructing grammars around word classes dates back to the first 
European grammar, the Techné of Dinonysius the Thracian. The tradition was not broken 
until Girard in his Les vrais principes de la langue française ou la parole réduite en méthode 
conformément aus lois de l’usage from 1747 made syntax the pivotal point of grammar. 
See Glinz (1947) and Robins (19903). 
46 Becker (1970: xiii). 
47 In this argument, one finds clear traces of the opening passages from Aristotle’s On 
interpretation (Περι ερμηνειας). 
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48 This could be the origin of the much debated context-principle in Frege’s work. For a 
thorough analytic discussion of Frege’s context-principle, see Kleemeier (1997). 
49 Discussions of the priority of either sentences over their parts, or the parts over the 
sentence were by no means restricted to the logical community, but formed the centre 
of a vital debate in German linguistics. Especially the confrontation between Wundt 
(claiming the primacy of the whole (the sentence)) and Paul (claiming the primacy of 
the parts) gained notoriety, see Knobloch (1988). 
50 Compare, for instance, Becker (1970: 66f) with Frege’s Die Verneinung (1918), in KS, 
362-78. 
51 Haselbach (1966) points to the romantic tradition for Naturphilosophie (Schelling). As 
indicated, also Aristotle, by the mediation of Trendelenburg, may have influenced 
Becker. 
52 Becker makes no functional distinction between expressing (ausdrücken) and denoting 
(bezeichnen) as Frege later is to do. 
53 See BS, xiii, 3. Notice however, that Frege, in spite of his pronounced dissatisfaction 
with the traditional denominations of grammar, at numerous places resorts to the 
traditional nomenclature of grammar (so, for instance, in Über Begriff und Gegenstand 
(1892), in KS, 167-78, in Ausführungen über Sinn und Bedeutung (1892/95), in NS, 128-
36, in GGA (1893) and in Logik (1897) in NS, 137-63). Naturally, this inconsistency has 
not escaped the critical eyes of Baker & Hacker (1984) who, rightly I believe, claim that 
Frege’s linguistic imagination stayed within the bonds of traditional, that is Beckerian, 
grammar (Baker & Hacker 1984: 79). 
54 Becker, no great systematic, unfortunately uses the terms Prädikat and Subjekt 
indiscriminately of levels. 
55 See also Aufzeichnungen für Ludwig Darmstaedter (1919) in NS, 273-77, 275. 
56 In BS, 18, Frege explains how to render the predicate-object-relationship by means of a 
two-place function, taking the subject for its first, and the object for its second 
argument. 
57 Becker did not himself coin the term Abverbiale for the latter constituent, however 
Wurst, who did much to popularise Becker’s ideas, did (see Glinz 1947: 71). 
58 To Götzinger’s grammar, see Forsgren (1992: 29-31, 250). 
59 As explained in, for instance, GLA and Über Begriff und Gegenstand (1892), in KS, 167-
78. 
60 See discussions in Bell (1979), Baker & Hacker (1984) and Wiggins (1984). 
61 Other leading figures of psycho-linguistics in Germany were: Moritz Lazarus 
(Steinthal’s friend and collaborator) and Wilhelm Wundt who was to develop the 
ethnic branch of Steinthal’s programme. 
62 Opposition against the Herbart view of psychology was not to emerge until the 1870s 
where Brentano, based on a personal reading of Aristotle, turned psychology into an 
introspective study of intentions. The difference between causal and introspective 
psychology is neatly mirrored in the vehement debates between Wundt and Marty (a 
follower of Brentano). See Knobloch (1992). 
63 Frege was certainly not the only one inferring agnosticism from Steinthal’s premises. 
See, for instance, Wegener (1885), Paul (1975), and, of course, Mauthner (1901). 
64 In Steinthal (1968). 
65 In the linguistic theories of the 20th century, we find the divide between belief in 
logical and non-logical “deep-structuring” represented in the respective positions of 
Montague (logical deep structure) and pre-minimalist Chomsky (biological deep 
structure). 
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66 There can be no doubt that Frege was familiar with the new psychology. In GLA, we 
find Frege mentioning the work of Herbart (GLA, 17); as for Vorstellungen, his primary 
source seems to have been a work of Stricker (Studien über die Assoziation der 
Vorstellungen, Wien (1883)). In GGA, Frege launched a severe criticism of Benno 
Erdmann, a late follower of Herbart. 
67 Steinthal (1968: xx). 
68 In linguistics, the idea, as well as the term of an inner form originates with Humboldt. 
However, in philosophy the concept is much older dating back to the writings of 
Plotinus. 
69 See, for instance, Wundt (1900), Mauthner (1901), Marty (1908), Porzig (1923) and 
Weisgerber (1926). 
70 The term “meaning” is here used as an intended (and necessary) simplification. In 
1855, Schleicher observed that the linguistic science had not even started investigating 
what we today might call the “semantic parts of language” (Schleicher called the 
missing discipline “functional theory” (Funktionslehre (Schleicher 1885: 10)). Half a 
century later, Marty was, on radically different premises, to repeat Schleicher’s 
judgement: if we compare the study of the semantic features of language (Marty called 
this study “descriptive semasiology”) with the study of the phonetic features, one 
cannot help noticing the undeveloped state of the former (Marty 1908: 69). Knobloch 
(1988) is good at debunking myths concerning the alleged flourishing of an 
autonomous discipline of semantics in the 19th century (Knobloch 1988: 239-241), 
however somewhat optimistic when assuming the 20th century to have proved more 
successful. There still is no clear idea of what the study of the semantic side of speech 
should involve, not even unanimity on what to understand by “meaning” or related 
terms. 
71 As for clarification, Steinthal is certainly no exception. Bumann is right, I think, in 
concluding that Steinthal’s discussions of what an inner form could be did not succeed 
in removing from this concept its apparently inherent obscurity (Bumann 1965: 122). 
72 Arguing genetically, Steinthal locates the first two instantiations of an inner form in 
the pre-history of speech. Originally, inner form worked by onomatopoeia, then inner 
form came to depend on etymology. Today, both kinds of inner form have 
disappeared, leaving us with the third kind of inner form solely sustained by 
synonyms. 
73 Steinthal (1972: 432). 
74 Dummett seems to have ended up assuming Fregean sense to cover three different 
aspects: (1) abstract objects, (2) routes to reference, (3) pre-theoretic meaning (see the 
informative paper of Skorupski on Dummett’s Frege (Skorupski 1984)); of these three, 
at least (1) and (2), objects and routes, cannot both be correct; so Frege’s idea of sense 
is inconsistent to Dummett (see “Frege’s Myth of the Third Realm” in Dummett 1991: 
250-262). Naturally, also Baker and Hacker find fault with Frege’s sense. They conclude 
their attempt at assembling as many of Frege’s comments on sense under the heading 
of (2) by judging Frege’s theory of sense 
riven with contradictions and fraught with inner tensions 
between irreconcilable principles (Baker & Hacker 1984: 
333) 
Some, like Church (1956: 6f) and Picardi (1996), have identified sense with linguistic 
meaning (itself a dubious concept (see note 70)). And most have agreed that Frege 
never explained how to separate senses from concepts (see below, especially note 79). 
75 KS, 349. In his paper Der Gedanke (1918), in NS, 342-62, Frege comes very close to 
Mauthner’s theory of individual (private) languages. See Kripke (1979) for a similar 
reading of Frege, and Nielsen (2003) for a thorough discussion of the issue. 
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76 The question of how to demarcate logic from grammar was also a hotly disputed issue 
among linguists. From Becker to Marty, most German linguists felt called upon to 
discuss the matter. However, since no clear conception of logic was available to any, 
the discussions routinely ended in indeterminacy. 
77 For reasons of simplicity, I have chosen to omit a discussion of Frege’s different 
anticipations of speech act theory, such as, for instance, the difference between 
asserting and expressing/denoting. Notice, by the way, that Austin, who translated 
Frege’s GLA to English, may have found inspiration in Frege for his realisation of the 
role played by speech acting elements. Furthermore, Frege was not the only one 
incorporating pragmatic features in his linguistic theory. See Nerlich & Clarke (1999) 
for a brief survey of “protopragmatic theories of language in Europe 1780-1930”. 
78 The idea that language, among its many components, should also include an artistic, 
poetic one was particularly promoted by Gerber (Die Sprache als Kunst (1871-73)). 
79 So, for instance in Ausführungen über Sinn und Bedeutung (1892/95), in NS, 128-36, 129. 
Notice that Church 1956, notwithstanding Frege’s caveat, chooses to identify the sense 
of a concept word with the concept itself. 
80 For a more detailed precise presentation of Frege’s model, see Kutschera (1989). 
81 The technique consists in analysing one’s material for constant and variable elements. 
What we chose to regard as constants, we identify as function expressions; the variable 
elements we take to be argument expressions. In Über Begriff und Gegenstand (1892), in 
KS 165-78, 173, Frege gives a brief intimation of how the technique could be applied to 
linguistic material. Incidentally, Hjelmslev, certainly without any knowledge of Frege’s 
pioneer work, was to reinvent Frege’s technique in Hjelmslev (1961). 
82 Frege often referred to these elements as colouring (Färbung) or illumination 
(Beleuchtung); see, for instance, Über Sinn und Bedeutung (1892), in KS, 143-62, 147, or 
Kurze Übersicht meiner logischen Lehren (1906), in NS, 213-18, 214. 
83 Tugendhat (1970: 177). 
84 Gruppe (1831): 
Now if philosophers have not learnt by careful linguistic 
study to replace these transitions of language, this high 
ladder, on which the sense and the referent [der Sinn und die 
Bedeutung] not only of singular words, but of the entire 
language depend, […] (Wenn nun die Philosophen nicht durch 
gründliches Sprachstudium diese Übergänge, diese hohe Leiter, zu 
ersetzen wissen, wovon allein der Sinn und die Bedeutung nicht 
einzelner Wörter sondern der ganzen Sprache abhängen) (in 
Cloeren 1971: 52) 
85 Sound, root, word, formation and flexion of the word 
contain sense and referent [Sinn und Bedeutung], however, 
these elements do not become live until activated by 
thought (Laut, Wurzel, Wort, Bildung und Flexion des Worts 
enthalten Sinn und Bedeutung, die aber erst durch das Geschäft 
des Denkens lebendig werden) (quotation from Haselbach 
1966: 39)
86 One could mention as different works as Paul Hankamer’s monography on the 
German language in the 16th and 17th centuries (Die Sprache (1927: 41)) or Ernst 
Jünger’s essay on language having for title Sense and Referent (Sinn und Bedeutung) 
from 1971. Perhaps, the idiom owes some of its popularity to the euphony of its 
rhythm (matching the ending of an hexameter). 
87 Notice that Frege, in Aufzeichnungen für Ludwig Darmstaedter (1819), in NS, 273-277, 
explicitly states that no isomorphism obtains between sense and referent. It is 
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therefore a little confusing to find Baker & Hacker speaking of a “triple-layered 
isomorphism” dominating Frege’s model of language (Baker & Hacker 1984: 316). 
88 In the name of precision, one ought to add that there are two value expressions, “The 
True” and “The False”, and two proper names “Truth” and “Falsity”, that are to be 
mapped to the same objects as sentences. 
89 To Baker and Hacker, Frege, when turning sentences into names, made a “disastrous 
move” (Baker & Hacker 1984: 124), however one, they think, symptomatic of the 
Augustinian vision of language that Frege, in their opinion, had fallen prey to (Baker & 
Hacker 1984: 23, 56, 61, 290). Also Geach (1972) regarded Frege’s nominalism as a 
corruption, however not of Augustinian origin. Instead, Geach refers the reader to 
Aristotle’s original corruption of logic which is to have first insinuated its way into 
logic when the Stagerite decided to abandon his (sound) division of the sentence into 
subject and predicate for the (untenable) two term-theory of sentences. 
90 See especially Müller (1888). 
91 Müller (1888) explains that he has chosen the name of Nominism instead of the 
traditional Nominalism in order to distinguish it from Occam’s system (in Schmidt 
1972: 61-62). 
92 In his many writings on Frege, Dummett has insisted on attributing to Frege a modern 
species of realism. See Bergmann 1958 for an attempt to place Frege in a modernised 
nominalism. 
93 See Erkenntnisquellen der Mathematik und der mathematischen Naturwissenschaften 
(1924/25), in NS, 286-94, 288-89. 
94 According to Kleemeier (1997), the so-called “paradox” would only constitute a 
genuine paradox if “the concept horse” (see below) did denote a concept (which, of 
course, it does not), see Kleemeier (1997: 241). 
95 So, for instance, Baker & Hacker (1984: 16, 255). 
96 So, for instance, Kleemeier (1997, 244f). 
97 So, for instance, Geach (1972: 216), Sluga (1980: 138) and especially Diamond (1984 
and 1995) (in both passim). 
98 For minor corrections, my presentation is identical to the one given by Frege in GLA 
71, 85, or in an undated letter to Huntington (in WB, 88-90, 89). 
99 Frege discusses the problem in Über Begriff und Gegenstand (1892), in KS, 167-78, and in 
Ausführungen über Sinn und Bedeutung (1892/95), in NS, 128-136. It is interesting to 
notice that Frege’s favourite example, the horse, is the same as that of Becker and 
Müller; all three, of course, harking back to Aristotle’s treatise on the Categories 
whence the tradition for illustrating linguistic problems with the word “horse” seems 
to have originated. 
100 Late in life, Frege seems to have changed his mind about what expressions like “the 
concept horse” could denote. In Logik in der Mathematik (1914), “the concept 
positive number” is said to be devoid of denotation (in NS, 221-70, 269), in 
Erkenntnisquellen der Mathematik und der mathematischen Naturwissenschaften 
(1924/25), “the concept fixed star” is criticised for suggesting to us the existence of 
something which cannot exist (in NS, 286-94, 289). In both cases, Frege puts the 
blame on the syntax of language. 
101 Technically, an expression like “concept” is a concept expression denoting a 
concept of second order. For argument the concept expression must therefore have 
a concept expression denoting a concept of first order (that is a concept under 
which objects fall). But “the concept horse” does not denote a concept of first 
order, and so fails to meet the semantic (denotational) conditions placed on the 
syntactical structure “the A is a B”, with “B” denoting a concept of second order. 
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102 Frege did actually devise a way of speaking of concepts without simultaneously 
adding falsity to oddity. For his device, see Ausführungen über Sinn und Bedeutung 
(1892/95), in NS, 128-36, 133. To some (Geach 1972: 216) Frege’s device is a 
workable solution, to others (Kleemeier 1997: 230) Frege’s device ends up in the 
same semantic (denotational) trap as that it was meant to evade. 
103 Über Begriff und Gegenstand (1892), in NS 167-78, 170-71. 
104 Erkenntnisquellen der Mathematik und der mathematischen Naturwissenschaften 
(1924/25), in NS, 286-94, 289. 
105 Sluga (1980: 144), Diamond (1984: 182). Like Geach (Geach 1976), both have 
found in Frege’s paradox the origin of Wittgensteins’s famous distinction between 
showing and saying. 
106 Der Gedanke (1918), in KS, 342-62, 347. 
107 From the view-point of science, language is deeply irreflexive. No scientific 
language can describe its own structure. For a further discussion of this axiom of 
irreflexivity, see my Nielsen (2003), where also Gödel’s later attempt at solving the 
same problem is analysed in detail. 
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